In their process of decentralization, deregulation and privatization of the infrastructure industry, Latin American countries are facing serious difficulties, particularly in the water sector. In Peru, 50% of water companies were experiencing financial losses eight years after a process of reform started. This study describes the implementation of a benchmarking scheme by the sector's regulatory agency, analyzes alternative measures of efficiency and estimates an efficiency frontier from a regression model of operating costs. Management culture and political interference were detected as important issues having an impact in this industry. Results may offer some guidance for future regulatory action in this emerging market.  2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
In their process of decentralization, deregulation and privatization of the infrastructure industry, Latin American countries face serious difficulties. In the water sector particularly, companies and governments must explain poor performance, inadequate system maintenance, high levels of unaccounted-for water, excess staff, low metering rates, and low water quality. This study focuses on the water sector of Peru to illustrate how yardstick comparisons can be used to improve sector performance. Unlike the work of Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) , which applies regression analysis to a developed economy, this analysis draws on initial data collection efforts in Peru and illustrates the applicability of the framework for developing economies.
The water and sanitation sector in Peru has undergone several changes in parallel with its political system. As Tamayo et al. (1999 Tamayo et al. ( ) describe, until 1990 , water services had a tradition of being the responsibility of the central government. With each new government, a new ministry was added and new entities were created to share responsibility for this sector, resulting in an increased conflict among roles and interests. Government handled investment requirements and pricing policies. Yet, the coordination of these activities was not clear, causing financial difficulties for utilities and, consequently, undermining performance in the sector.
The legal framework also contributed to the situation. Giving human consumption the highest priority by law could be seen as a problem in setting the value of water resources for different sectors of the economy, had tariffs and structure financing not obeyed political interests in such an evident way. Under the populist regime of [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , tariffs were allowed to decline in real terms. Yet even with higher tariffs, mismanagement was evident in the failure to replace leaking pipes or increase metering, which together with poor billing practices play a leading part in any explanation of why these water companies in Peru have financial difficulties. Alcázar et al. (2000) mention that by the end of the populist regime, about a third of connections were metered in Lima, the capital, and about 10% of users were billed according to a meter reading. In parallel with this scenario, water demand was limited by low coverage and rationing.
After 1990, the water sector moved to a decentralized system under the responsibility of municipalities. Municipalization was the organizational option selected by the new government to resolve the limited capacity of the centralized system to meet the needs of a growing urban population. As part of the reform process, measures aimed at restoring the financial stability of the companies were undertaken. Water rates were adjusted and national investment recovered, but these actions were still politicized at the local level. Even when companies raised production, billing declined in a greater proportion, indicating water loses. Excessive staff and a high turnover rate among top management because of politicization continued to be present in the sector companies.
In 1992, the government created the regulatory agency SUNASS (Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios de Saneamiento) to regulate water and sanitation services. Among other responsibilities, SUNASS was to restructure companies providing water and sanitation services (known as Empresas Proveedoras de Servicios or EPS), with the main objective that all the urban area at a national level will receive service administered by these companies. This goal involved the incorporation of localities within the scope of an existing company, the creation of new EPS as needed, and the promotion of EPS fusion where feasible. By 1998, eight years after the reform process started, 50% of the companies were experiencing financial losses without signs of a significant recovery.
How can SUNASS determine the cause of these companies' financial difficulties? What factor or factors make a difference regarding the performance of an EPS? How can SUNASS determine when a company should be consolidated into another one? Are excessive staffing patterns and administrative expenses depriving resources from important operating activities?
The economic and political issues facing water utilities are complex and embedded in local institutional settings. Moreover, the lack of appropriate comparative data about water service has made it difficult for customers to exert pressure on the water companies. This pressure could act as an incentive for managers to be responsive toward the company performance.
Regulators commonly use efficiency indicators, such as number of workers per connection and number of connections per population density, to assess utilities' performance. However, such measures are not good substitutes for efficiency frontiers, which recognize the much more complex nature of interactions between inputs and outputs. Because the tendency is to use both efficiency indicators and frontiers to obtain a general idea of a firm's performance, both are used in this study seeking detection of possible cost elements in this sector that may affect companies' efficiency.
The next sections address some of these issues. Section 2 explains the benchmarking scheme implemented by SUNASS. In Section 3, an analysis of the accounting and operating data of the water sector companies is presented. Next, Section 4 summarizes results and a discussion of cost determinants. Section 5 introduces a regression model for operating costs. The last section provides some concluding observations.
The SUNASS benchmarking scheme
In late 1999, SUNASS established a benchmark system representing the first step toward informing citizens and political leaders about the relative performance of the municipal utilities (SUNASS, 1999) . The agency's expectations were that EPS with low efficiency would gradually reach the level of the most efficient companies in response to greater pressure to perform efficiently.
Performance measurement has been recognized as a way of introducing competitive pressures and motivating appropriate behavior by management. As Smith (1990) points out, comparative data is one of the few means whereby consumers can appraise the quality of local services. The process of benchmarking has long been used by private enterprise, but has only recently been used in the public sector, particularly in infrastructure. As mentioned by Shleifer (1985) , regulators need a simple benchmark, other than the firm's present or past performance, against which to evaluate the firm's potential and assure cost control, prevent waste, and promote costreducing innovation.
The basis of a benchmarking technique is the establishment of an efficiency frontier in which each firm occupies a relative position. Comparability of outputs and inputs across each firm is a key element, but the most crucial aspect is the selection of the measures of efficiency. The key point is that regulators must make choices reflecting overriding objectives of water users, firm managers, and policymakers. Selecting a measure of efficiency is also complicated by the fact that, although both financial and non-financial measures are used, there is a lack of an accepted framework for integrating the two.
SUNASS developed a system of efficiency indicators as a product of internal work groups and guidance from a consulting World Bank group, and applied it under a benchmarking scheme. The working process consisted of first detecting areas of efficiency affecting the interests of each stakeholder and then identifying indicators for each of these areas. Nine indicators were selected and grouped in four areas of efficiency:
ț Quality of Service, groups three variables: compliance with the residual chlorine rule; continuity of service, and percentage of water served receiving chemical treatment. The first two areas of efficiency are intended to represent the interests of society; the third area reflects the companies' performance, and the fourth represents the stockholders' perspective. Each indicator was assigned a weight of 1 as a first step in the benchmarking process. The emphasis on social fairness is evident in the greater number of indicators related to efficiency affecting society. Each indicator expressed as a percentage is multiplied by its weight and added to the percent total per company. This total per company is divided by nine, the number of indicators. Finally each company is ranked on the basis of points attained within a group, with groupings determined by number of service connections, as follows:
ț 17 EPS are small with less than 10,000 connections. ț 20 EPS are medium-sized, with 10,000-40,000 connections. ț 7 EPS are big, with 40,000-160,000 connections. SEDAPAL, the water and sanitation utility of Lima, is not included in this study since its high number of connections (959, 356) would distort the results. Additionally, SEDAPAL is not under direct regulatory responsibility of SUNASS. For a detailed analysis of this EPS, see Alcázar et al. (2000) .
Each company sets its efficiency indicators within a master plan according to its financial and operational resources. This document is submitted annually to SUNASS for review and approval. Once the master plan is approved, it is viewed as involving mandatory targets. At the end of the year, the ranking based on actual data is calculated by SUNASS and published. However, there is no penalty under regulatory law if plan objectives are not reached. The first publication of a benchmark by SUNASS in 1999 corresponded to the ranking of 1998, listed by EPS name in Table 1 .
One of the difficulties faced by the regulator in Peru in analyzing the data is the heterogeneity of the companies' performance. A general idea of relative performance can be seen in Fig. 1 , which shows unit revenues, unit profits, and unit operating costs for all companies expressed in the national currency of Peru (Soles) per cubic meter of water produced. We also observe the small operating margins (revenues minus operating costs, not including depreciation) of these companies. Exploring possible linear relationships among these values by using a Pearson Correlation statistic, we find that company size is linearly related to revenues and operating costs, but the linear relationship is not strong for profits. The following values of a Pearson Correlation Coefficient (r) indicate these relationships: size is linearly related to revenues with r = 0.981, to operating costs with r = 0.982 (both significant at the 0.01 level), to profits with r = Ϫ 0.208.
It is not easy to give a precise diagnosis about inefficiencies without a specific technique to evaluate relative efficiency as reflected in costs and production technologies. Nevertheless, considering the problems of the water sector already mentioned, the relations among some of the variables available will be explored. From the efficiency indicators selected by SUNASS, focus will concentrate on morosidad (number of accounts receivables divided by number of bills) expressed in months, coverage (number of citizens receiving service divided by total population in the area) as a percentage, quality of water (compliance with the residual chlorine rule) measured as a percentage, and continuity of service measured in hours. Other variables from the accounting data of each company for the period 1996-1998 are also used.
Analysis of the data
In this analysis, the proportion of elements comprising total cost is examined. The proportion of each element of cost may show possible areas of managerial weakness. Unit cost is used to analyze its relationship with the selected factors. To obtain unit cost per cubic meter, each cost is divided by volume of water produced. The data set available for this analysis consisted of each company's financial statement and operating data. The accounting variables are explained according to the particular methodology used by these companies.
Even when this study does not focus on level or structure of tariffs, they are an important piece of information regarding companies' performance, so Fig. 2 is included to show a relation of average tariffs, unit operating costs and unit profits, all variables in soles per cubic meter. It is interesting to see how average tariffs cover unit operating costs in the majority of the companies. Tariffs are linearly related to the size of the companies, revenues, and operating costs, with Pearson Correlation Coefficients equal to 0.376 (with a 0.05 level of significance), 0.402, and 0.418, respectively (both significant at a 0.01 level). The linear relationship between tariffs and profits is not strong (r = Ϫ0.137).
Costs and expenses
Total cost is the sum of operating and finance costs. Operating cost is confirmed by sales cost, sales expenses, administrative expenses, depreciation and provision for uncollectables. Finance cost includes finance expenses plus amortization on debt. Finance costs represent less than 10% of total cost in 57% of the EPS. Energy cost is included by these companies in sales costs.
Administrative expenses represent more than 25% of operating costs in 73% of the EPS, and more than 40% of operating costs in 38.6% of the companies. The composition of this group of companies is as follows: 47% are small, 35% are medium-sized, and 28.6% are big companies. Salary expenses are distributed in sales cost, sales expenses and administrative expenses according to the type of work performed and whether it is under a contract. Salary expenses represent more than 40% of operating costs in 66% of the EPS, where 70.5% are small, 60% are medium-sized, and 11% are big companies.
Excess staff may contribute to the low productivity of these firms. In fact, a ratio equal to or greater than 6 employees per 1000 water connections is found in 40% of the EPS (59% of these companies are small, 30% are medium-sized, and 28.6% are big). A ratio of 2-3 employees per 1000 connections is found in an efficient water company. This ratio helps to explain high administrative expenses, particularly among small EPS.
Unaccounted-for water
The ratio of volume of water billed to volume of water produced gives us a measure of unaccounted-for water. Fig. 3 shows this relation. We should expect the EPS to lie on a 45 degree line if water produced is also billed, but the graph shows a different story. Sixteen of the EPS (36%) have more than 50% of water not accounted for where 17.6% are small companies, 60% are mediumsized, and 14% are big. A well-managed water service company has a value of 10-20% for this measure. 
Morosidad
SUNASS selected morosidad-the ratio of bills not yet collected to the total number of bills expressed, in months-as an indicator of management efficiency. Morosidad exceeds six months for 34% of the companies (29% are small, 35% are medium-sized and 14% are big). Accounts receivable do not necessarily affect revenues in a noticeable way; however, in this case it might be of big importance given the constrained situation of these companies. Fig. 4 shows the relation between morosidad and revenues per cubic meter of water produced. We notice in the graph that there is a subtle inverse relation between these two variables, shown by a tendency line. This relationship is evidenced by a low Pearson Correlation Coefficient of Ϫ0.116. The relation between morosidad and size of the company, profits, and operating costs was also tested and gave low correlation coefficients as well (size of the company: r = 0.064; profits: r = Ϫ0.233; operating costs: r = Ϫ0.032). Although these values are low, we may argue that the lower the time wait for bill collection, the higher the level of revenues and profits. 
Coverage
Coverage is linearly related to operating costs, with a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of 0.955, and linearly related to size of the companies, with r = 0.949 (both at a 0.01 level of significance). Percentage change in coverage will indicate how companies expanded their service during 1996-1998. The data indicate that 32% of the companies increased their coverage by more than 20% during this period where 53% of the companies are small, 20% are medium-sized and 14% are big. We expect to see a percentage change in operating costs related to this change in coverage, but the correlation analysis indicates that the linear relationship is not strong (r = Ϫ0.065) although the negative sign might give us an indication of some scale economies. Fig. 5 shows this relationship.
This low coefficient may indicate the influence of other factors that can affect cost as coverage increases. For instance, the number of districts administered by each EPS is an interesting variable to consider. Number of districts is linearly related to coverage, with r = 0.824, and linearly related to operating costs, with r = 0.827 (both at a 0.01 level of significance). The bottom line may be the presence of political factors.
As noted by Tamayo et al. (1999) , provincial and district mayors decide the makeup of EPS boards. The votes are distributed according to the number of existing connections. Mayors in districts with high coverage have no incentive to expand service within districts with low coverage because their relative power would be reduced. Districts with high coverage may not border each other, and, in fact, the distribution of districts for several EPS involves some distance. Although information on coverage per district is not available, the relation between number of districts and operating costs is explored in Section 5. Fig. 6 shows the relation between quality and unit operating cost. The level of quality is measured as a percentage according to the amount of chlorine found in the water with respect to its required value. As observed from the graph (r = 0.352 at a 0.05 level of significance) unit operating cost remains within the same set of values for the entire quality range. Evidently, the amount of chlorine found in water is not sufficiently costly to affect a company's operating cost. Although surprising, the selection of this factor as a water quality indicator by SUNASS may be explained by the fact that water quality standards in Latin American countries lag behind those of developed countries. Quality standards in these countries usually refer to the minimum value required to guarantee some acceptable level of health to the population. In fact, it is hard for a citizen to judge water quality when a high volume of it is supplied by secondary vendors who bring water from private wells, most probably without any type of chemical treatment. As Solo (1998) asserts, secondary water vendors account for more than 30% of the water supplied in Honduras, Guatemala City and Lima. Continuity of service displays a similar result with respect to unit operating costs. Making water service available for more or fewer hours does not have a significant impact on costs.
Quality of water and continuity of service

The effect of region
Water companies in Peru are located in three different regions: (1) Sierra (Mountain); (2) Selva (Forest) and (3) Costa (Coast). Unit salary expenses, administrative expenses and unit revenues are higher in Costa (region 3) and Selva (region 2) than in Sierra (region 1). Unit operating costs are lower in Selva which is explained by its source of water. Quality and continuity are not influenced by region.
Results from the analysis
A high level of salary expenses, the result of a high ratio of employees per 1000 water connections, affects the performance of water service companies in Peru. In fact, as Alcázar et al. (2000) mention in their study, the reform undertaken by SEDAPAL at the beginning of 1992 included a reduction of more than 50% of its labor force between 1988 and 1996. Labor costs fell sharply and workers per 1000 connections fell from more than 6 to 2. The reduction in labor expenses and a rise in tariffs allowed SEDAPAL to make a profit in 1993 for the first time in more than a decade, an indication that labor costs indeed have an important effect on this sector. In particular, salary expenses and administrative expenses explain the performance of small water companies in Peru.
Regarding the medium-sized companies, two additional factors help explain their financial difficulties: a high level of unaccounted-for water and morosidad. It is obvious from the data that operational practices are in general inefficient in this sector: poor regular and preventive procedures allow a high level of water loss through old pipes. This, together with the possibility of water theft, explains the high level of the unaccountedfor water indicator. However, considering the values found for both factors, unaccounted-for water and morosidad, we may argue that medium-sized companies are facing difficulties in coping with their amount of connections and consequently with the size of their network.
Big companies have a higher operating margin than the other groups, but this is offset by the fact that profits decrease as number of connections increases. This may reflect poor cost containment and technical management practices.
Expansion of service for small EPS has been significant and shows compliance with the main goal of SUNASS. The findings related to expansion and change in operating costs had allowed us to set the foundation for the regression model presented in the next section. The concept of service quality in Latin American countries helps to explain the selection of the service quality factors by SUNASS. The regulator selected a sensible approach to countervail the concept of low water quality standards in Peru by emphasizing quality service indicators within the benchmarking scheme. Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis. Finance indicators are indicated with "X" and service quality indicators with "O". Companies that are experiencing losses are highlighted. The diversity of results in each group is observed. How can these indicators help the regulatory agency? Assigning different weights to these indicators according to the obtained results may complement the benchmarking process initiated by SUNASS.
The regression model
The regression model presented follows Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) and OFWAT's (1999) model for operating cost. Theory of production tells us that outputs y are produced by inputs x, given a technology set P. The boundary of P represents a production function F(y,x) so that P may be defined as:
The origin of disagreements between regulators and utilities may reside in uncontrollable factors outside the definition of outputs and inputs. Expanding the production set to include a firm-specific factor z reflects this issue.
In the regulatory context, the cost frontier is of primary concern. A cost frontier is the outcome of a minimization process, given the prices p of inputs x. Cost is the product of inputs x and their prices p such that the cost frontier becomes
Following Farrell (1957) , cost efficiency can be defined as the ratio of necessary to actual costs,
where px represents actual operating costs for each company. Prices constant across the sample are assumed so the requirement is to estimate a sub-cost function conditioned on p as C * (y,z / p) = (OperCost)K.
Since most empirical applications use translog or Cobb-Douglas formulations for the functional form of C * , natural logarithm as Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) did for their analysis is used:
Expressing ln(OperCost) as a linear function and assuming ln K is normally distributed with mean m, and independently of the terms containing y and z, then the ordinary least squares regression as the best, linear unbiased estimator of lnC * + m is used. Thus, the application of OLS would produce an unbiased estimate of the parameters of the cost frontier. Residuals will signify possible efficiencies or inefficiencies, and the observation with the largest negative residual will be considered to be the 100% efficient company. Following OFWAT, the variables used to estimate operating cost are volume of water produced (Volprod) and the length of mains (Length) measured in kilometers. However, unlike OFWAT, we do not know the proportion of water delivered to measured households as opposed to commercial customers. On the basis of the analysis of the data in the last section, the number of districts administered by each company (Loc) to explore its effect on operating costs are introduced. Also dummies for region as follows are introduced: RC = 1 if the company is located on the coast, 0 otherwise (region 3 = Costa), RR = 1 if the company is located in the mountains, 0 otherwise (region 1 = Sierra).
The size of each company is represented in the model by volume produced. The actual operating cost does not include depreciation or provision for uncollectables. Three observations were dropped (companies 2, 4 and 36) since they did not have values for length. The regression equation to be estimated is lnOperCost ϭ a 1 ϩ a 2 RC ϩ a 3 RR ϩ b 1 lnVolprod ϩ b 2 lnLength ϩ b 3 lnLoc.
The intercept captures the effect of region 2 (Selva). Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values and all cross-terms, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was accepted. Estimation of the regression equation produced the following result, with t-ratios in parentheses: lnOperCost ϭ 2.496
The above model suggests that the main operating cost drivers in Peru's water sector are volume of water delivered, the length of mains, the number of districts administered by a company and the region where the company is located. These factors explain more than 90% of the variation in cost. Cost savings are associated with a greater number of districts served and location in region 1 (Sierra). Number of districts and region 2 (Selva) are statistically significant at the 10% level, region 1 (Sierra) at 5%, and volume produced and length at 1%. The coefficient on region 3 (Costa) is not statistically significant. The model appears to be a good fit with R 2 adjusted = 0.908 and a standard error of the estimate = 0.4015.
The resulting signs are very informative. Cost savings from region 1 (Sierra) may be explained by the source of water. Waterworks that draw water from rivers differ in costs from works that draw from groundwater. The sum of the coefficients of volume and length with a value of 1.241 reflects scale economies. To better explore a surprising result (why number of districts was statistically significant), alternative models were estimated (see Table 2 ). These differed mainly in how the number of districts is treated, either as a dummy (representing 1, 2-4, or more than 5 districts) or as a logarithm variable.
There was an increase in statistical significance when introducing the dummy instead of the logarithm form. When number of districts is equal to 1 (model 5), the coefficient is positive and not statistically significant. When number of districts is between 2 and 4, the coefficient is found to be negative, but not statistically significant. Finally when number of districts is greater than or equal to 5, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence in all models. Thus, it may be concluded that there are cost savings associated with number of districts greater than or equal to 5.
A possible explanation for this result is the presence of economies of scope (in terms of distinct geographic or political areas served by an EPS). Another possible source of economies stems from political factors that might raise costs when only a few districts are served, but promote efficiency with more districts. Under current voting rules, water companies may choose to expand service to districts with high levels of coverage because of political support from the board of directors. As number of districts increase, there may be a reduced role for political influence and favors in terms of inefficient practices in employee hiring. Such a decline in costly activities may contribute to observed cost savings for multidistrict EPS.
An important implication obtained from the model specification is the effect of mergers on operating costs. Consider the initial specification of the model and rewrite it as:
).
If a merger occurs between two equally situated companies, we obtain the following:
Joint OperCosts
Utilizing the specific coefficients from the basic model (2) estimation, we have:
Thus, Joint OperCosts = 2(OperCosts). This result suggests that when two water companies of equal size merge, the operating costs of the new company will be roughly equal to the sum of the initial operating costs of the merged companies. Of course, this specification does not include the nonlinear effects that would be obtained if two firms with three districts joined together, which would reduce the political interference that appears to cause higher costs when only a few districts are serviced by the ESP. Increasing number of districts and, in consequence, the mergers among companies that result in a joint company with more than five districts appear to be a source of significant cost savings generally.
Companies with positive residuals have below-average efficiency while companies with negative residuals have above-average efficiency. The levels of efficiency Another interesting result is shown in Fig. 7 . As revenues increases, efficiency tends to decrease. In fact, r = 0.598 at a 0.01 significant level. An explanation of this may be that cost containment receives less attention as revenues increase. Management may feel less pressure as they see revenues increase, so operating costs are not minimized. Under a competitive environment we would expect to see efficient companies with positive profits and inefficient ones with financial losses. Fig. 8 provides evidence for a lack of incentives for efficiency within the companies (r = 0.065). 
Concluding remarks
The heterogeneity of the water service companies in Peru presents a major difficulty for the regulator in establishing levels of performance. The introduction of a benchmarking scheme has been a first step for SUNASS, given its limited regulatory instruments. Understanding the differences between companies and groups of companies will promote the use of efficiency measures.
Even when just a few measures were used, the task of benchmarking is complex if clear objectives are not established. How to use efficiency values on a benchmarking scheme is a key issue for a regulator. Combining financial and non-financial measures in this survey of comparative data provided a general idea about the performance of these companies.
Other factors influencing costs were detected by using a regression analysis. As expected, the efficiency ranking obtained from the regression model differs from the SUNASS ranking using the efficiency indicators.
Although it may seem discouraging at first, emphasis should be on results by group: companies with coincident ranking and those with differences. This type of analysis will help in assessing which indicators and with what weight should be considered for the next benchmarking phase.
However, much work still needs to be done. Clearly, the agency needs to place greater emphasis on service quality factors and refinement of finance indicators. In a country with national water coverage at 69%, it is difficult to obtain a political consensus on paying for sector expansion and service quality improvements. Additionally, the lack of readily available comparative data about quality, prices, quantity and service coverage has made it hard for customers to exert pressure on the water companies. Publication of benchmarking results by SUNASS is a good start and may help customers and other stakeholders become more informed about poor performance relative to other companies and thus lead to pressures for reform and industry restructuring.
The use of a regression model for operating costs allowed us to establish a cost frontier. Companies were ranked according to their efficiency levels. Efficiency represents the deviation of each company's actual operating cost from the average. Average operating cost was estimated by considering the effects of region, the volume of water produced, length of mains and the number of districts administered by each company. The effect of number of districts is interrelated with political factors. Cost savings from number of districts may be associated with economies of "political non-interference" rather than with scope economies. The effect of this variable warrants additional attention.
The results from efficiency vs. unit profits within the companies are clear. No relation was found between efficiency and profitability (measured by operating margin). This may imply a lack of incentives for attaining efficiency within the companies, which may reflect the absence of regulatory instruments for rewarding or penalizing the firms.
Rules constrain utility decision-makers only when enforcement mechanisms exist. Any kind of regulation or government intervention creates incentives. However, if the agency cannot reward excellent performance, technically sophisticated studies and planning documents mean nothing unless they can be translated into improvements in sector performance. At present, SUNASS can collect "master plans" and announce quality standards, but this has little impact if municipal managers face no consequences for poor performance. If the law is ambiguous or does not give appropriate tools to agencies responsible for the oversight of the water sector, then the law should be revised by targeting the sources of current inefficiencies.
Although SUNASS is to be commended for publicizing the efficiency measures presented in Table 1 , the impact of continued data collection and benchmarking requires a clear set of financial and quality service objectives. The regulatory agency has taken some initial steps. Now it is time for other stakeholders to support reform initiatives that can promote better performance across firms in this important infrastructure sector.
